Teilhard de Chardin


R.U.P. (Residue of Unresolved Positivism)
R.U.P. occurs when positivism--"the position that there is an unbridgeable gulf between mental experience . . . and the objective world, the outside world of nature"--"remains in fact in a man's mind even though he may have in philosophical theory rejected or resolved it" (SP 13). Those who exhibit R.U.P. "do not really believe that man's consciousness ever was a part of nature's any more than it is now" (RCA 190).

Those Barfield accuses of succumbing to R.U.P. include the archetypal psychologist C. G. Jung, the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, and geologist / theologian/ evolutionary thinker Teilhard de Chardin.1

"I can philosophize myself free from philosophical materialism quite easily; and so, I dare say, can you. . . ," Barfield remarks in History, Guilt, and Habit, but that does not mean we are free of its influence:

after we have done the philosophizing and gone back to ordinary life, the materialism is still there in our very instruments of thoughts, and indeed of perception: it signifies that it is there in the meanings of the words we speak and think with, and notably so in the commonest words of all--words like "thing," "life," "man," "fact," "think," "perceive," and so on. It is not merely a habit but an ingrained habit. It is even what we call "common sense." (HGH 73)

Our "Beta-Thinking . . . can convince itself that we participate the phenomena with the unconscious part of ourselves. But that has no epistemological significance. It can only have that to the extent that final participation is consciously experienced" (SA 137).
See in particular "The Force of Habit" (HGH 65-93), "The Time-Philosophy of Rudolf Steiner" (RCA 184-204).
1In Romanticism Comes of Age, Barfield laments that
    Nowhere have I found any real grasp of this central fact: that self-consciousness, that subjectivity itself, is an historical process. There are hints of it perhaps in Jung; and sometimes some of the anthropologists--Durkheim, for example, or Levy-Bruhl, with his 'participation mystique'--seem to imply it. But sooner or later they drop some remark which shows that at the bottom of their imaginations they still believe that man has always, in fact, been what the Phenomenologists would call 'an embodied self in Nature'--neither more nor less of a self than he is today. They show that they do not really believe that man's consciousness ever was a part of nature's any more than it is now. But only that he made a mistake and thought it was-a very different thing. (RCA 190)